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Abstract
Under financial constraints, exporting may have less to do with productivity and more to do with fi-
nancial resources. The established relationship between exporting and productivity would differ when
examined through the lens of the working capital needs of the firm. I approach the hypothesis that work-
ing capital matters in the firm’s exporting decision in two ways: first, by articulating a dynamic working
capital model of the firm that incorporates the firm’s export decision. Secondly, by testing the hypothe-
sis empirically using a unique firm level dataset from Bangladesh, where issues of financial constraints
are particularly acute. The model shows that productivity determines export status of the firm as long as
it is not under financial constraints. However, under financial constraints, export status is less dependent
on productivity and more dependent on the availability of working capital. Empirical results support the
model’s prediction. The relationship between exporting time and the need for greater liquidity is also borne
out empirically as shown by a positive and significant correlation between the amount of working capital
and the distance of export destination. An important policy implication from the analysis is that short term
liquidity is critical in allowing productive firms to export and that access to finance may prevent the benefits
of trade liberalization within a country to be fully realized.
1 Introduction
The growth of exports is a key priority for many developing countries as a means to access foreign earnings
and to stimulate economic growth1. Yet, among developing countries, access to external finance is a major
problem. The World Bank Investment Climate Surveys, covering more than 26,000 firms across 53 develop-
ing countries, find that the cost and access to finance is considered by firms to be the top 5 problems they face
(Hallward-Driemeier and Smith (2005)). An important question to ask is how do financial constraints affect
the export decision of the firm. This questions is particularly relevant in light of the recent financial crisis,
where the freeze on credit coincided with a drop in world exports of more than 30 percent2 that cannot be
entirely explained by the drop in aggregate demand.
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To understand how financial constraints affect export status, the first step is to ask what are the financing
needs of an exporting firm. Take for example, a firm owner who has to decide between selling to domestic
or foreign markets. She/he would face export specific costs such as the costs of licensing or getting entry
to markets.3 However, beyond these additional costs, the owner also faces a significant difference in timing
between domestic sales and foreign sales. I show that in the case of Bangladesh, exporting to Hamburg can
take up to 39 days. With domestic sales, goods would be delivered faster and the payment for the goods
received within a shorter time. With foreign sales, although the goods will fetch a higher price, the goods
will take longer to deliver and the payment will be received with a longer delay. I also show that most
firms receive payment only after their goods have been delivered. The decision to export involves the owner
asking themselves whether they would be able to remain liquid during the period before payment is received.
Operating liquidity in financial metric terms is working capital. As such, to address how financial constraints
affect the export decision of the firm, it is necessary to understand how working capital affect the export
decision of the firm.
This paper makes two contributions to this question. First, I articulate a dynamic working capital model
of the firm’s export decision. Second, I test the empirical predictions of the model using a unique panel
dataset of Bangladeshi firms and find robust evidence that financial constraints provide a significant barrier
to exports.
The theoretical model builds upon the dynamic working capital model of the firm Chan (2008) and ex-
tends it to the export decision of the firm. To my knowledge, there are no existing trade models that have
formalized the role of working capital in exporting decisions.
Working capital underlies two fundamental concepts in trade: costs to entry and the role of distance in
determining trade volumes. The extra working capital demands from exporting over domestic sales due to
shipping time, formalizes the concept of sunk cost or the cost of entry which many trade models are premised
upon (see Alessandria and Choi (2007); Arping and Diaw (2008); Das et al. (2007); Bernard et al. (2006);
Bernard and Jensen (2004)). Furthermore, as the amount of working capital directly reflects transportation
time, the greater the distance, the greater the working capital demands in exporting. Therefore, the model
also speaks to the area of trade research on how distance determines trade volumes as well as on how time
can act as a trade barrier (see Hummels (2001); Clark et al. (2004); Islam et al. (2005) for research in this
area ).
The main theoretical result is that the export decision of the firm is determined by both productivity and
working capital and their relative importance depends on whether the firm is financially constrained or not.
The model shows that exporting depends primarily on productivity if the firm is not financially constrained.
When firms are financially constrained, however, a lack of working capital can severely restrict a firm’s
willingness and ability to engage in exports. The implication is that among the population of firms, there will
exist low productivity firms that never export regardless of their cash positions, and cash-poor firms that do
not export regardless of their productivity levels.
To assess the importance of this mechanism, I use a unique firm-level dataset which allows two key as-
pects of the model to be examined: a) a direct test of the interaction between financial constraints, working
capital and productivity in determining the export status of the firm, and b) the relationship between working
capital and the export distance that underlies the rationale behind the theoretical model. The 2002 Bangladesh
Investment Climate Survey is one of the few panel datasets available that contain firm level financial infor-
mation, their access to credit and detail information on exports. The empirical results provide support for the
3Costs to exporting also include shipping and transportation, custom duties and many more. These are discussed in Hummels (1999).
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model’s predictions that the affects of working capital and productivity will differ between financially con-
strained and unconstrained firms. Specifically, for financially constrained firms, productivity matters less than
for unconstrained firms while working capital matters much more. The correlation between working capi-
tal and export distance is shown empirically to be positive and significant, lending support for the working
capital model of the firm’s export decision.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the relevant literature for both theoretical
firm models and empirical work in the area of export and finance4, Section 3 motivates the need for the
working capital model of export decision by taking a preliminary look at the data to examine the distribution
of productivity between exporting and non-exporting firms and also to look at the additional working capital
demands that exporting imposes, Section 4 develops the working capital model of the firm’s export decision,
Section 5 examines the empirical results and then the conclusion.
2 Relevant Literature
The role of firm productivity as a determining factor for the export status of the firm has been researched
extensively both theoretically through the heterogeneous firm models of Melitz (2003); Bernard et al. (2003)
and empirically in the work of Pavcnik (2002); Bernard et al. (2003); Bernard and Jensen (2004). It is,
however, ambiguous as to whether the existence of financial constraints changes the relationship between
productivity and exporting.
The literature on the interaction of trade and financial factors has existed for some time Kletzer and
Bardhan (1987), but the emphasis has been on incorporating finance into the theory of comparative advantage
to explain trade patterns across countries. Only more recently has the new trade literature begun to consider
the role of finance in heterogeneous firm models (see Manova (2006, 2008); Chaney (2005); Suwantaradon
(2008)). Existing models of exporting decisions such as Manova (2006); Chaney (2005); Suwantaradon
(2008) assume a set percentage of borrowing and do not account for the accumulation of internal finance
that affect financial constraints and reduce the demand for borrowing. Their models assume that all firms
are affected by financial constraints, due to the set borrowing requirement, and therefore financial constraints
will always influence exporting decisions, regardless of differences in internal financing between firms. This
is a restrictive assumption as it is important to take into account of both good financial health, when firms do
not require to borrow, and when firms are financially constrained so as to accurately capture the impact of
financial constraints on the distribution of firms in the aggregate.
Existing models also assume that allocation of credit is perfectly aligned to productivity. This assumption
drives the result of these models: exports with financial constraints simply raises the productivity cutoff across
all firms. Existing models assume no time difference between inputs and revenues and as such, the financing
of the inputs responds directly to the input choice. This, coupled with the assumption that credit is perfectly
aligned with productivity, drives the existing models’ result.5 However, existing literature has shown that the
allocation of credit does not correspond perfectly to productivity (see Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Banerjee
and Duflo (2005)). The assumption of direct correspondence is thus too strong as it does not allow for the
existence of distortions in the allocation of credit. The assumptions made by existing theoretical models,
4The literature on the area of trade credit , such as Fisman and Love (2003); Fisman (2001); Fisman and Love (2004); Fisman and
Raturi (2004); Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) reviewed in Chan (2008).
5The working capital model differs from the existing models in that the firm’s maximization problem at time t is bounded by
predetermined internal revenues- that is, revenue is a state variable. Even if credit is perfectly aligned to productivity in the working
capital model, this would not detract from the predictions that are driven uniquely by the timing difference between inputs and receipt
of revenues.
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static borrowing demand and direct correspondence between allocation of credit and productivity, lead to
essentially the same result as predicted by Melitz (2003) with the caveat that financial distortion raises the
productivity cut off level across all firms.
The empirical literature using micro level data on the relationship between exporting and finance is limited
due to both the availability of firm level datasets as well as the topic being an emerging area of research. Of
note, one of the few studies is Greenaway et al. (2007) that uses a large UK panel dataset. They show
that financial health of firms positively affect export decisions. Another more recent study, Berman and
Hericourt (2009) uses cross section of firm level data across 9 developing countries and they find that access
to finance is important to the firm’s decision to enter exports. Furthermore, they find that financial constraints
create a disconnection between firms’ productivity and their export status: productivity is only a significant
determinant of the export decision if the firm has a sufficient access to external finance. While the existing
empirical work show that there are significant relationships between exporting and financial factors, neither
studies relate these empirical findings to a model that explains the underlying economic relationships that
drive these results.
3 Why might working capital restrictions affect exporting decisions?
The Bangladesh Investment Climate Assessment 2002 surveyed 990 firms and collected annual recall data
for 2000 and 2001 for key variables, except for access to finance questions that are only reported for 2002.
A total of six manufacturing industries are represented: Garments, Textiles, Food, Leather, Electronics and
Chemicals. The distribution of firms within each of these industries is representative of the composition of
the Bangladeshi economy, with 57 percent of the observations in the garments and textiles industry. The
dataset contains financial information that allows working capital to be measured at the firm level. Working
capital is defined in the data as the sum of inventories, accounts receivable and cash on hand.6 Working
capital can be though of as current assets or the liquidity of the firm. A unique characteristic of the dataset
is that it contains country destinations of exports. This allows us to look at whether the distance to country
destinations is correlated with working capital at the firm level.
There are three major observations from the data that indicate working capital is particularly important
for exporting. First, there are substantial additional costs to exporting in the form of custom duties and
procedures. Table 1 shows that average official costs are 84,935 takas (approximately $1,456 USD) and
average unofficial costs total 32,895 takas (approximately $564 USD). In light of the average value of exports
is only 139,981 takas (approximately $2,399 USD), total custom costs are a substantial cost to firms in
Bangladesh. In addition to these costs, exporting firms also hire clearance agents to help get them through
customs -around 90% of exporting firms use a clearance agent at an average cost of 0.82% of the value of the
freight. These costs plus the time delays in customs would require the firm to have adequate working capital
in order to just get their goods through customs.
Second, exporters do not get paid until their goods are delivered to the export destination for a much
larger proportion of their sales than non-exporters. Table 2 shows that on average, 89 percent of the sales
for exports is paid upon delivery (median is 100 percent) compared to 65.74 percent for non-exporting firms
(median 75 percent).7 Therefore, exporters would require to cover a greater percentage of their costs with
6Working capital is measured according to the accounting definition: current assets (inventories, accounts receivable, cash and short
term credit) minus current liabilities (accounts payable and any short term debt). Note that working capital data is only reported for 2002
7A proportion of sales is also bought on credit, and here, non-exporting firms appear to extend more credit than exporting firms.
Extending credit to customers would further delay the receipt of revenues from when the cost of production was incurred. On average,
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Table 1: Costs to Customs
2002 Bangladesh ICA Mean Standard Deviation
Average days to clear customs 8.87 10.69
Maximum number of days to clear customs 14.10 13.76
Official costs (takas) 84935 440869
(USD) 1456 7556
Unofficial costs (takas) 32895 221242
(USD) 564 3792
Value of exports (takas) 139981 321491
(USD) 2399 5510
Percent that use clearing agent 89
Cost of agent as % of the value of freight 0.8132 3.109
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
Note: The exchange rate in 2002 average is 0.017137961 takas=1 USD
Table 2: Timing of payment for sales
Mean
% of Sales paid
before delivery
% Sales paid at
delivery
% Sales bought
on credit
Number
of Obs
Non-Exporting
Firms
5.57 65.74 28.43 561
Exporting
Firms
2.87 89.42 7.66 421
Total 4.41 75.89 19.53 982
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
their own working capital than non-exporters. Furthermore, the longer the time period is between production
and delivery, the greater the amount of working capital is required.
Last, delivery times are longer for exporters than non- exporters. Turnover time differs from industry to
industry. It ranges from a month in garments to 4 months for shrimp farming (Arnold (2004)). For firms
that export, clearing customs, transiting to overseas destination and clearing foreign customs all add to the
amount of time firms have to wait before receiving payment for their goods. The time to clear domestic
customs is on average around 9 days, with a maximum of 14 according to the 2002 Bangladesh ICA (see
Table 1) For transiting time, Bangladesh exports are shipped using international shipping lines that run on
regular schedules. The time in transit consists of: overland to port, a feeder journey from Chittagong or
Dhaka to Singapore to meet up with the international shipping line, and then the destination port to customer
location. According to Arnold (2004) , the greatest delays are caused in the exchange from feeder to mainline
vessel as schedules may not synchronized and containers may wait in the transshipment port for several days.
His estimate of ocean transit times from Bangladesh, using a variety of shipping companies, is between 25-35
days. Figure 1 shows the transit times for APL shipping (the world’s sixth largest container transportation and
shipping company) which corroborates the Arnold (2004) estimate. Without even counting for time needed
to clear foreign customs and inland delivery, selling to European markets from Bangladesh can add an extra
month to the product cycle. Considering that production of garments only requires about a month to process,
exporting essentially would double the amount of working capital required.
amongst those that do extend credit to customers, 43.77 days of credit is extended with a median of 30 days. This is funded mainly from
retained earnings ( median of 60%, with the rest from micro lenders or informal lenders). This implies that those firms that extend credit
to their customers are doing so because they have enough cash or access to finance. They charge their customers extra for the credit for
the delay in the receipt of payment and the delay is not crucial for completing the exchange. Unlike the delays caused by shipping across
large geographical distances which are unavoidable and crucial to completing the transaction between the exporter and the customer.
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Figure 1: Ocean Transit Times (Days) from Chittagong
Source: APL Limited (American President Lines Ltd.) at
http://www.apl.com/services/documents/sells_mkt_ia_chtct2.pdf
Figure 2: Export Destination and Working Capital
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
Notes: Average of the percentage of working capital to total costs (sum of total wage cost, raw material cost, energy
costs and other costs). Other sectors and regions drop due to lack of observations.
Among exporting firms, Figure 2 shows that the amount of working capital is increasing with the distance
of export destination. This relationship is particularly stark with Europe and the EU - destinations that have
the longest shipping transit times from Bangladesh. This suggests that if firms require additional working
capital the longer the transit time or the greater the distance of the export destination.
4 A Model of Export Decision with Working Capital
The previous section motivates the importance of working capital in the firm’s export decision. This section
presents a dynamic model of the firm’s export decision that allows for differences in liquidity to affect export
decisions. The purpose of articulating an export model where working capital is required for production is
to show how productivity and cash interact to jointly determine export status of the firm, and as a result, the
presence of financial constraints distorts the selection of the most productive firms into exports through the
time demand for liquidity required for exporting. The interaction is highly intuitive: the firm exports if it has
met both productivity and cash requirements for exporting. This implies that among the population of firms,
there will exist low productivity firms that never export regardless of their cash positions, and likewise, cash
poor firms that do not export regardless of their productivity levels. The interaction of productivity and cash
as necessary conditions to enter exports would give rise to lower correspondence between productivity and
export status of the firm than the correspondence predicted by earlier models.
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Figure 3: Time line for Production and Receipt of Revenue
t-(1+S)
Determined export 
sales(t-(1+S))
… t-1
Determined domestic 
sales(t-1)
t
Receive domestic sales(t-
1)
Receive export sales(t-
(1+S))
Discover price Pt
Determine domestic 
salest
Determine export salest
t+1
Receive domestic sales 
shipped at t
Receive export sales(t-S)
Discover price Pt+1
Determine domestic 
salest+1
Determine export 
salest+1
… t+(1+S)
Receive domestic sales 
(t+S)
Receive export sales 
shipped at t
Note: Price Pt represents both domestic price PD and foreign price PF .
Take a representative firm within an industry with the production function F(Kt ,Lt). At each period, the
firm chooses inputs in labor and capital as well as the percentage of output, ψ , to sell to international markets8
to maximize all future stream of profits. Capital takes one period to install. Labor is inelastically supplied.
Productivity, Ai, is exogenously given and differs across firms. Firms know their productivity level and makes
production decisions based on the uncertainty of output and prices in the domestic and foreign markets.9
The firm also has access to financial services where it can borrow or save, b, at interest rate r.10 The
standard assumptions apply where wages, w, the price of capital, pk, and the interest rate, r are assumed to be
exogenous and non time varying. The discount factor given by β = 1(1+r) and the depreciation rate of capital
given by δ . Entry to export markets requires a fixed cost, f , each period, which can be viewed as a license,
permit or agent’s fee to export.
To incorporate the need for working capital, time delays between production and receipt of revenue are
introduced. The time delays are as follows: selling to domestic markets requires one period to receive the
revenue and selling to international markets requires S periods in addition to the one period delay that is
normally incurred through domestic sales. That is, exporting requires additional time for products to be
shipped and received overseas over that of domestic sales. Figure 3 shows the timing of production and
receipt of revenue. At each period, the firm receives the revenue from past sales: past sales includes any
domestic sales from period (t− 1) and any export sales from period (t− (1+ S)). At each period, the firm
also decides on production to be sold domestically and/or exported - the revenue from which will be received
either at the next period (t+1) or at t+(1+S) periods later. All costs of production are incurred at the time of
production, regardless of whether products are going to export or domestic markets, but the production choice
affects the transitional equation at the present period and at (1+S) period when export revenues arrive.
At each period, the firm discovers the prices for output; the domestic price, PDt and the foreign price, P
F
t .
Both prices are stochastic over time. For simplicity, the present value of the foreign price is assumed to be
always greater than domestic price so that there is an incentive for firms to enter exports, β SPF −PD > 0.11
8 Likewise, (1−ψ) percent is sold to domestic markets
9This departs from current literature where firms only realize their productivity after paying a fixed cost Melitz (2003); Manova
(2006); Suwantaradon (2008). The rationale is that firms are privy to more information about their own operations and how productive
they are more so than knowing the price conditions on foreign markets.
10Note, this follows the international finance literature in that b represent bond holdings and positive implies savings and negative
implies borrowing.
11Relaxing this assumption will simply allow more instances where firms will choose not to export because it isn’t as profitable.
The objective of this paper is to highlight how financial constraints affect export behavior, and thus it is important for firms to have an
incentive to export in the first place.
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The availability of export markets can be thought of as an additional mechanism to transfer resources over
time: domestic sales get PD and returns are delivered at time t+1 while international sales get PFt but incurs
a fixed cost and returns are delivered at time t +1+S.12 Intuitively, the extra time required for exports costs
the firm the discount rate β S on revenue which is increasing with time S. The delays imply that at each period,
the firm has a stock of wealth made up of revenues that are due from past production and any bond holdings
from last period. This stock of wealth is the firm’s working capital, Xt :
Xt = (1−ψt−1)PDt−1AF(Kt−1,Lt−1)+ψt−(1+S)PFt−(1+S)AF(Kt−(1+S),Lt−(1+S))+(1+ r)bt−1
The cash the firm has at any particular point will not include all export sales pending from all previous
periods but only the export sales due at that period. The revenue for export sales is only realized as cash at the
period the firm receives it. Working capital is liquidity, and pending payments that are not received cannot be
used to pay for inputs.13
The firm chooses labor, investment and percentage of production to export according to how much work-
ing capital it has. Therefore, the firm’s budget constraint is given by:
wLt + pk (Kt − (1−δ )Kt−1)+{ ft |ψt > 0}+bt = Xt
Financial constraints are introduced as a limit on how much the firm can borrow at any particular time.
The firm is restricted to borrow only up to a percentage, ϕ , of it’s total wealth: bt ≥−ϕXt .14
Define piD as the current value profit from only domestic sales; piD = βPDAiF(K,L)−C(K,L,K−1).
Likewise, define piE as the current value profit from sales where exports are non-zero;
piE =
(
(1−ψ)βPD+ψβ 1+SPF)AF(K,L)−C(K,L,K−1)− f . Variable costs are denoted by C (K,L,K−1)=
wL+ pk(K− (1− δ )K−1). The dynamic maximization problem of the firm can be described by the value
function defined below:
V (X ,K−1) = max
ψ=0,ψ>0
{
max
L,K
piD+βE
[
V
(
X ′,K
)]
+ν [(1+ϕ)X−C(K,L,K−1)]
s.t.X ′ = PDAiF(K,L)+ψ−sPF−sAiF(K−s,L−s)+(1+ r) [X−C (K,L,K−1)] ,
max
L,K,ψ
piE +βE
[
V
(
X ′,K
)]
+ν [(1+ϕ)X−C(K,L,K−1)− f ]
s.t.X ′ = (1−ψ)PDAiF(K,L)+ψ−sPF−sAiF(K−s,L−s)+(1+ r) [X−C (K,L,K−1)− f ]
}
Following Bond and Van Reenen (2007), the borrowing constraint for domestic,(1+ϕ)X−C (K,L,K−1)≥
12The firm also has available bonds, that earns interest, r, that is received also at t +1. It is implicitly assumed that the rate of return
from domestic production is greater than the interest rate - or else there is no incentive to produce. In other words, PD is bounded from
below such that there is always an incentive to produce.
13It is possible that pending payments could be used as collateral to borrow more, but this scenario will be left for further research.
The focus of this paper is to look at cash strap firms in developing countries where any kind of credit is difficult to obtain even on cash
collateral.
14This setup differs from the existing literature in three ways: 1) borrowing is endogenously chosen, 1) the probability of exiting
export markets is not assumed a priori, 2) the amount the firm produces for domestic and international markets is chosen endogenously
by the firm in response to relative prices and 3)the time required to trade and the resulting liquidity requirements are modeled explicitly.
I take out the assumption of monopolistic competition, where exporting firms can influence price levels, and substitute this with financial
constraints as this may be a more realistic assumption for firms in developing countries.
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0 and for exports, (1+ϕ)X −C (K,L,K−1)− f ≥ 0, is embedded in the value function where ν denotes the
shadow value of loosening borrowing constraint.
The firm’s maximization problem involves 2 steps due to discontinuity introduced by the fixed cost of
exporting. First, given the cash available and output prices, the firm determines the output levels that will
maximize profits under domestic sales as well as for export sales. Under export sales, the firm also determines
the optimal amount to export if exporting. Second, the firm then chooses between the two profits to determine
whether to export.
4.1 Domestic Sales
The firm’s dynamic problem in the domestic sales case reduces to only two possible solutions, as established
in Chan (2008); the firm is either not financially constrained, in which case it produces at the optimal, or it is
constrained, in which case, it produces as much as it can given cash on hand. The first order conditions are
repeated below:
Unconstrained:
βPDFL(K,L) = w(1)
βPDFK(K,L) = pk. (r+δ )(1+r)(2)
LD∗ and KD∗ is the solution to the firm’s maximization problem if and only if:
Equation (1) and (2) hold and (1+ϕ)X−wLD∗− pk(KD∗− (1−δ )K−1)> 0.
Otherwise, the solution is given by Equations (3) and (4) below:
Constrained:
βPDFL(K,L)
w =
βPDFK(K,L)
pk +
(1−δ )
(1+r)(3)
X = 1(1+ϕ)
[
wL+ pk(K− (1−δ )K−1)
]
(4)
Let V ∗D(Ai) denote the value of the value function of optimal domestic profits as a function of A and let
XD∗(Ai) denote the minimum cash requirement for unconstrained profits to occur. Note that both profits and
cash requirements are increasing with technology, A. Let V D(Ai, Xi) denote the value of the value function
where profits are at constrained optimal (where Xi < XD∗(Ai)). It is necessarily so that constrained optimal
profits is lower than unconstrained profits: V ∗D(Ai)>V D(Ai, Xi) .
4.2 Export Sales
The firm’s dynamic problem in the export sales case can also be similarly reduced to two scenarios. Let
Σ denote the expected sum of all future shadow values up till the period export revenue is received; Σ =
E [νS−1(1+ϕ)]+ .....E [ν ′(1+ϕ)]. This can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of liquidity due to export-
ing. The first order conditions under export sales are given by:
9
∂V
∂L
:
((
(1−ψ)PD+ψβ SPF)βAFL−w)(1+E [∂V ′∂X ′
])
= νw+ψβ 1+SPF AFL.Σ(5)
∂V
∂K
:
((
(1−ψ)PD+ψβ SPF)βAFK−β (r+δ )pk)(1+E [∂V ′∂X ′
])
= ν pk +ϕβν ′(1−δ )pk +ψβ 1+SPF AFKΣ(6)
∂V
∂ψ
:
(
(−βPD+β 1+SPF)AF(K,L)+βE [∂V ′
∂X ′
∂X ′
∂ψ
]
+β 1+SE
[
∂V (1+S)
∂X (1+S)
∂X (1+S)
∂RF
∂RF
∂ψ
]
(7)
either ν 6= 0⇒ (1+ϕ)X−C(K,L,K−1)− f = 0,
or ν = 0⇒ (1+ϕ)X−C(K,L,K−1)− f > 0
Identical to the case of optimization of domestic sales, the choice of labor and capital is governed by
their respective marginal cost when unconstrained and governed by the binding budget constraint when con-
strained. Unlike the case of domestic optimization, optimizing export sales involves taking into consideration
of the additional future periods until export sales revenue are received.
The first order condition for exports dynamically captures the timing differences between domestic sales
and export sales and also show why this matters under financial constraints. One way to see this, is by
simplifying the first order condition by substituting in ∂X
′
∂ψ = −PDAF(K,L) and ∂X
(1+S)
∂RF
∂RF
∂ψ = P
F AF(K,L)
into the first order condition for ψ , Equation (7). This yields:
∂V
∂ψ
= AβF(K,L)
[(
β SPF −PD)−E [∂V ′
∂X ′
]
PD+β SE
[
∂V (1+S)
∂X (1+S)
]
PF
]
(8)
The entire term in the square brackets can be interpreted as the net price of exporting which has two com-
ponents: i) the difference in price between exporting and domestic, given by
(
β SPF −PD), and ii) the value
of the timing of the different revenue streams, given by −E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
PD+β SE
[
∂V (1+S)
∂X(1+S)
]
PF . An increase in the
percentage of exports will increase export revenue via the +β SE
[
∂V (1+S)
∂X(1+S)
]
PF term at time (1+S) while a de-
crease in the marginal domestic revenue, via the −E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
PD term at the next period. Each of these revenue
streams are weighted by the corresponding value of cash at that point: ∂V
′
∂X ′ , the expected change in the value
function due to additional cash at the next period and ∂V
(1+S)
∂X(1+S)
, the expected change in the value function due
to additional cash at time exports arrive, (1+S). The second component, −E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
PD +β SE
[
∂V (1+S)
∂X(1+S)
]
PF ,
is only relevant when financial constraints are binding as that is the only time when additional liquidity brings
value to the value function.15
The additional time dimension of the export sales maximization problem makes the solution less tractable
than the domestic case. However, the export maximizing solution can be characterized similarly as domestic
sales into unconstrained and constrained scenarios:
Unconstrained
If constraints are never binding during the S periods it takes for international sales to be
received, i.e. ν = ν ′ = .....νS = 0, then:
15Cash, X , in of itself does not contribute to the value function but only when financial constraints bind.
10
∂V
∂ψ
= AβF(K,L)
(
β SPF −PD) ψ = 1
ψβ 1+SPF AFL = w
ψβ 1+SPF AFK = pk.
(r+δ )
(1+ r)
Constrained
(
β SPF −PD)(1+E [∂V ′
∂X ′
])
= β SPFΣ(9)
wL+ pk(K− (1−δ )K−1)+ f = (1+ϕ)X(10) ((
(1−ψ)PD+ψβ SPF)βAFL−w)
(((1−ψ)PD+ψβ SPF)βAFK−β (r+δ )pk) =
νw+ψβ 1+SPF AFLΣ
ν pk +ϕβν ′(1−δ )pk +ψβ 1+SPF AFKΣ(11)
Equation 9 comes from a derivation of the first order condition from exports, given by:
∂V
∂ψ
= AβF(K,L)
((
β SPF −PD)(1+E [∂V ′
∂X ′
])
−β SPFΣ
)
(12)
16
Thus the solution to the export maximization problem is as such:
• If there are no binding future constraints for all future periods up to (1+S), i.e.Σ= 0, then the marginal
value of increasing export sales is strictly positive. Exports in this case will be the maximum amount
possible which is 100 percent; ψ = 1.
• If there are binding future constraints in the period up to (1+S), the extent that financial constraints are
binding during that time will determine the amount of exports. The choice of ψ affects the size of Σ,
the shadow values ν and ν ′ as well as E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
. The choice of labor, capital and export percentage will
be determined where all three equations are satisfied. Exports in this case can take on values between
0 and 100 percent due liquidity constraints.
Let V ∗E(Ai) denote the value of the value function of optimal domestic profits as a function of firm specific
technology Ai and let XE∗(Ai) denote the minimum cash requirement for unconstrained profits to occur.
Additionally, let V E(Ai, Xi) denote the value of the value function where profits are at constrained optimal
(where Xi < XE∗(Ai)). It is necessarily so that constrained optimal profits are lower than unconstrained
profits: V ∗E(Ai)>V E(Ai, Xi)
The cash requirement, XE∗(Ai), to satisfy Σ = 0 can be calculated by iterating backwards the budget
constraint from the period when export revenue is received. At that period, cash on hand must be greater than
expected cost. ie Xt+s > 1(1+ϕ)Et [Costt+s] for constraints to not bind. Likewise for the period before that, and
so on and so forth. The minimum cash required for constraints to not bind for each period thus can be given
as: 17
16This utilizes a backward iteration of ∂V∂X = E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
+ν(1+ϕ) that allows us to summarize the change in the value function at time
(1+S) in terms of the history of shadow values leading up to it: E
[
∂V 1+S
∂X1+S
]
= E
[
∂V ′
∂X ′
]
−Σ.
17The cash threshold is defined for where the firm also expects to export in the future. An alternative scenario is that, due to
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Let CF denotes the cost to produce optimally at foreign prices.
XE∗(Ai) = CF + f −β 1+SPFt AiF(K,L)
+Et
[
CF + f
]( S
∑
s=1
β s
)
+Et
[
CF + f
] 1
(1+ϕ)
β 1+S−ω(13)
Given : ω = β SPF−1AiF−1+β
S−1PF−2AiF−2+ . . .+P
F
−(1+S)AiF−(1+S)
The characteristics of the cash threshold as defined by Equation 13 is intuitive as all costs enter positively;
an increase in production costs and fixed costs will raise the cash threshold. Revenues enter negatively; if
foreign price, PF , increases, the amount of cash required to export will decline. ω denotes the current value
of foreign sales revenue that is going to be delivered in the future, between t = 0 and t = (1+S), from past
production. If the firm has never exported before then ω = 0. If the firm has exported before (and the greater
the value of ω is), the lower the initial amount of cash required to export. This captures how firms are more
likely to export, if they have exported before. The motivation here, however is not a learning story as is often
forwarded by existing trade story (ie Clerides et al. (1998)), but one of liquidity and the timing of when cash
arrives - firms that have exported before will have more liquidity to export in the present period.
The cash requirements also show that in addition to the fixed cost f required to export, the firm requires
additional liquidity to cover the longer delays in exporting. The term Et
[
CF + f
](
∑Ss=1β s
)
is the cost of
production for exporting sales during the interim. The greater the distance, S, the greater the cash required
for the firm to not run into binding liquidity constraints. Thus it captures the role of distance in exporting
and relates this to the liquidity demands. The borrowing allowance ϕ also affects the cash threshold: if it
decreases, the threshold also increases as firms cannot rely on external borrowing to finance production but
need to finance internally.
The cash threshold is an increasing function of firm productivity Ai as cost of production, C, increases with
inputs L and K which themselves are increasing functions of productivity. Intuitively, greater productivity
increases the level that optimal scale of production is reached.
4.3 Exporting Decision
The exporting decision rests on choosing between domestic sales or export sales depending on which value
stream is greater. The value streams depend on the state variables Ai and Xi.18
First, looking at technology Ai, let’s assume that the firm’s cash level Xi is greater than the minimum cash
requirement to export, XE∗(Ai). The firm picks the maximum of the two unconstrained optimal value streams:
V ∗D(Ai) or V ∗E(Ai) . As cash is not a binding constraint both at the present time period and in the future,
the firm need only compare current profits: piD∗ = βPDAiQD∗−CD∗ to piE∗ = β 1+SPF AiQE∗−CE∗− f . The
higher than mean expected price realizations, the firm is able to export once but expects to return to domestic sales only as prices
return to expected mean. In this scenario, the cash threshold , XE∗FD(Ai), will be lower. XE∗FD(Ai) = CF + f − β 1+SPFt AiF(K,L)−
Et
[
βPDt+1AiF(K,L)−CD
](
∑Ss=1 β s
)
+Et
[
CD
] 1
(1+ϕ)β
1+S−ω
Price expectations are iid such that: Et [Pt+1] = Et [Pt+2] = . . . = Et [Pt+T ]. Expected costs at time t are the same: Et
[
CFt+1
]
=
Et
[
CFt+2
]
= . . .= Et
[
CFt+T
]
where CF denotes the cost to produce optimally at foreign prices and CDthe cost at domestic prices.
18Recall that all firms are assumed to face the same prices, wages and interest rates.
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productivity threshold, A¯, is defined where piD∗ = piE∗:
A¯ =
CE∗−CD∗+ f
β 1+SPF QE∗−βPDQD∗
The productivity threshold exhibits some intuitive characteristics in terms of it’s parameters. An increase in
the foreign price PF or a decrease in the domestic price, PD, lowers the threshold as this causes exporting to
be more profitable relative to domestic sales. Likewise, an increase in the fixed cost, f , raises the productivity
bar for firms to be profitable exporting over domestic sales. An increase in the delay, S, such as through
shipping distance, increases the threshold through the discount rate.
The productivity threshold is important in that it defines the minimum technology level required for the
firm to be profitable in exporting. It would not be profitable for a firm with technology below the threshold
to export, regardless of it’s cash position. This threshold holds even under financial constraints as a firm that
is not profitable exporting without constraints, will not be profitable exporting with constraints.
However, productivity alone does not determine whether the firm exports. While the productivity thresh-
old separates firms with the ability to export from those that cannot, whether the firm has the means to do
so will depend on the level of cash, Xi. Clearly, if the firm meets both productivity and cash requirements,
Ai > A¯ and Xi > XE∗(Ai), the firm will export. Also, if the firm does not meet productivity requirements,
Ai < A¯ , then the firm will not export regardless of the cash position, Xi. Therefore, out of the set of solu-
tions dependent on the state variables Ai and Xi, the situation where the firm meets productivity requirements,
Ai > A¯, but does not have the cash, Xi < XE∗(Ai) , is the only combination left to fully map out the solution.
Previously, in the sections on domestic sales and export sales, the minimum cash levels required for
unconstrained optimal were defined as XD∗(Ai) and XE∗(Ai) respectively. If the firm has cash levels below
the minimum domestic “unconstrained optimal”, that is Xi < XD∗(Ai), then the firm would necessarily not
choose to export as the value of exporting is lower than domestic sales, V D(Ai, Xi) > V E(Ai, Xi) . This will
hold regardless of productivity levels, Ai. Intuitively, if the firm cannot afford to produce at optimal for
domestic markets, it would not produce for export markets where there are even greater demands on liquidity
due to fixed cost of exporting and the longer delays in the receipt of revenues, even if Ai > A¯.
Take the situation when the firm’s cash level is above the minimum domestic unconstrained optimal
but below the minimum export unconstrained optimal, that is XD∗(Ai) < Xi < XE∗(Ai) and Ai > A¯. In this
case, the firm has more than enough liquidity to sell at domestic optimal, but not enough to sell at the
export unconstrained optimal. The firm needs to compare between unconstrained optimal domestic sales,
V D∗(Ai, Xi), with constrained export sales, V E(Ai, Xi), where export percent is less than 100 percent. This
situation gives rise to two interesting outcomes: either a) the firm chooses to export, but it will export at less
than 100 percent which is unusual to observe when there is a fixed cost to export, or b) the firm chooses to
sell to domestic markets even though it meets productivity requirements.
The export decision mapped accordingly to the interaction between the two state variables Ai and Xi can
be summarized by Figure 4. All firms below the productivity threshold needed to be profitable in export sales
do not export regardless of cash levels; that is, if Ai < A , then exports will equal zero, ψ = 0, for all values
of Xi (Areas IV, V and VI in Figure 4). All firms that above the productivity threshold, and are not financially
constrained to export, will export 100 percent; that is, if Ai > A¯ and Xi > XE∗(Ai), then exports will equal one,
ψ = 1 (Area III in Figure 4). Area I in Figure 4 demarcate values of cash that constrain firms from producing
at domestic unconstrained optimal levels and thus will not export despite productivity levels that are above
the threshold; if Ai > A¯ and Xi < XD∗(Ai), then exports will equal zero,ψ = 0. Area II demarcate values
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Figure 4: Summary of Model Results
Note: FC -Financially constrained, NFC - Not financially constrained.
of cash that constrain firms from producing at unconstrained export optimum, but allow the firm to produce
at unconstrained domestic optimum. Here, export able firms will choose to mix export sales with some
domestic sales depending on the level of cash on hand; that is, if Ai > A¯ and XD∗ < Xi < XE∗(Ai), then export
values will take on values between zero and one, 0≤ ψ ≤ 1. Within Area II, cash is the greater driver of the
export status of the firm. For example, take two firms with the same cash level Xi where XD∗ < Xi < XE∗(Ai)
and both has productivity levels higher than the threshold. The firm that has lower Ai would have a higher
likelihood of exporting as it has lower liquidity requirements to export. (See cash threshold requirements
Equation 13 that the higher the Ai the greater the the cash is required to produced at unconstrained optimal)
The results of the working capital model with exports is unique in that it captures the tension between
time and payoff that arises under financial constraints. The firm faces a tradeoff between getting a higher
price but waiting longer, or getting a lower price but getting it sooner in its decision between exporting and
domestic sales when financial constraints are present. Under severe financial constraints, such as in Area I
in Figure 4, firms choose to sell to domestic sales as liquidity constraints demands that payoffs be received
sooner - eventhough the option of selling at a higher price is available. Under severe financial constraints,
firms cannot afford to wait the longer time it takes to export. As financial constraints become less restrictive,
such as in Area II in Figure 4, the firm will mix both domestic and export sales to maximize payoff and the
timing of when revenue is received to ensure adequate working capital for future production.
The decision to export under financial constraint is analogous to a decision in investing in an illiquid in-
vestment. This occurs as liquidity becomes important when firms are financially constrained. When liquidity
is important, firms would not strictly specialize in domestic or exports so as to not put all their liquidity in
one longer term illiquid investment. Instead, they would choose to spread the ‘liquidity investment’ over both
domestic and export sales.
The working capital model with exports is essentially a model of liquidity for the firm, that draws parallels
with models of liquidity in the household savings literature (ie. Deaton (1991)). Additionally, the working
capital model provides an alternative explanation to recent trade research that attribute the negative correlation
of domestic sales with exports to decreasing returns to sales Nguyen and Schaur (2010) and Ruhl and Willis
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(2008) .
The results of the export working capital model of the firm shows that the export decision of the firm is
determined by both productivity and working capital. The model exhibits the characteristic results of Melitz
(2003) in heterogeneous firm models of export, where exporting depends on productivity but also highlights
the fact that this only occurs if the firm is not financially constrained. The working capital model shows that
under financial constraints, the lack of working capital can yield different export outcomes even if the firm is
productive enough to export. Liquidity constraints can constrain export potential firms to not export and/or
export less than 100 percent. Therefore, the correspondence between productivity and exporting is much
weaker
5 Empirics
This section examine empirical evidence in support of the model. First some stylized facts are presented:
1) the most productive firms do not necessarily self select into exporting and there does not appear to be
a productivity cut-off above which all firms export, 2) significant differences exist in physical and working
capital between exporters and non- exporters even within the same industry and 3) access to finance differs
significantly between exporters and non-exporters and credit does not appear to be allocated according to
productivity.
The Bangladeshi dataset allows two key aspects of the model to be empirically tested: a) whether the
export status of the firm is determined by both productivity and working capital and that their effects depends
on whether the financial constraints are present, and b) whether there is a relationship between working
capital and the export distance.
5.1 Stylized Facts
5.1.1 Productivity of exporters and non-exporters in the data: Self selection not evident.
Productivity is measured as total factor productivity estimated according to Ackerberg et al. (2006) as the
method allows for more generally plausible assumptions as to the dynamic data generating process of the in-
puts used to estimate the production function. 19 A possible caveat to estimated productivity is that estimates
of the production function with a large proportion of financially constrained firms could potentially underes-
timate factor coefficients as firms are not operating at optimal scale. This potentially could bias the size of
the TFP estimate but not the distribution of tfp overall. However, the consequences of estimating production
functions with firms operating sub-optimally is not clear and is left as possible future research.
The dominant trade theory at the firm level (Melitz (2003); Bernard et al. (2003)) predicts that, within
each industry, the firms at the upper distribution of productivity above a certain cut off will export while those
that are below will produce only for the domestic market. Trade liberalization induces a self-selection of
the most productive firms into exports. However, this self selection is not evident in the data and it does not
appear that export firms are necessarily the most productive. Figure 5 on the next page shows the distribution
of productivity for exporters and non exporters in each industry.20 If there is evidence of self selection, the
19TFP was also calculated using OLS, RE, FE and using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. The OLS estimate suffer from
endogeneity issues and both fixed effects and random effects estimates relies on strong assumptions on ωit and has not worked well in
practice. The LP estimates relies strictly on specific assumptions on the data generating process of the inputs to production that may not
hold generally (see Ackerberg et al. (2006)) and is prone to suffer collinearity. See Appendix A.1 on page 27
20Furthermore, Table 12 in Appendix A.2 shows that the median productivity level do not substantially differ between exporters and
non-exporters and, in fact, shows that mean productivity is higher for domestic firms than for exporting firms in all sectors except for
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Figure 5: Distribution of Productivity and Export Status
Source: Bangladesh 2002 ICA, World Bank. Productivity as measured by estimated total factor productivity
using Ackerberg et al. (2006). See A.1 on page 27 For table of inter quartile range
productivity levels of exporting firms would be within a range that is distinctively higher than the range of
non exporting firms. However, the productivity range of exporters overlap non-exporters in each industry.
The distortion to self selection due to financial constraints as articulated by the working capital model (see
Figure 4) in fact provides an explanation to the non correspondence seen in in the date (Figure 5).
5.1.2 Differences between Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms: Working Capital, Physical Capital
and Size.
Table 3 examines firm characteristics that differentiate exporters and non-exporters. Along with the estab-
lished differences in size and age21, the difference in means between exporting and non-exporting firms in
output, physical capital and working capital are also examined. Two main patterns emerge: First, the direction
of the differences between exporting and non-exporting firms are not the same across all sectors. Exporting
firms are on average older than non exporting firms except for Electronics and Chemicals sector. The same
reversal of the difference is seen in output, physical capital, physical capital per worker and working capital
per worker.22 This suggests that between industries, age and physical capital may have different effects in
determining whether a firm exports. Secondly, working capital and labor are the only two variables where
exporters consistently have a higher mean than non-exporters across all sectors. The significance of the dif-
ferences are even sharper when samples are taken according to productivity cutoffs and the direction of the
differences remain unchanged.
Leather and Chemical.
21Differences in firm size and age has been shown to be persistent in different empirical studies both of the US and in developing
countries (Bernard and Jensen (2004); ?).
22While this may not be the case for physical capital, physical capital per worker and working capital per worker if we considered
Textiles as an abnormality, for age and output this remains true.
16
Ta
bl
e
3:
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
be
tw
ee
n
no
n-
ex
po
rt
er
s
an
d
ex
po
rt
er
s
by
se
ct
or
G
ar
m
en
ts
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
A
ge
7.
31
1
7.
46
5
7.
44
2
-0
.1
54
-0
.3
02
L
og
O
ut
pu
t
11
.4
1
11
.2
6
11
.2
8
0.
15
1.
83
0
N
um
be
ro
fW
or
ke
rs
41
8.
5
47
1.
1
46
3.
1
-5
2.
6
-1
.0
99
L
og
Ph
ys
ic
al
C
ap
ita
l
8.
77
1
9.
19
9.
12
6
-0
.4
19
-3
.7
59
L
og
W
or
ki
ng
C
ap
ita
l
8.
97
4
9.
10
7
9.
08
7
-0
.1
33
-1
.1
63
Fo
od
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
A
ge
15
.3
1
33
.3
7
17
.7
4
-1
8.
06
-4
.0
71
L
og
O
ut
pu
t
9.
88
4
11
.0
7
10
.0
4
-1
.1
86
-4
.2
23
N
um
be
ro
fW
or
ke
rs
12
6.
4
42
6.
9
16
7.
3
-3
00
.5
-3
.8
39
L
og
Ph
ys
ic
al
C
ap
ita
l
8.
43
9
10
.4
9
8.
71
5
-2
.0
51
-7
.9
53
L
og
W
or
ki
ng
C
ap
ita
l
7.
65
5
10
.0
8
7.
98
3
-2
.4
25
-8
.8
76
E
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
A
ge
13
.1
8
12
13
.1
5
1.
18
0.
40
2
L
og
O
ut
pu
t
9.
67
8
11
.2
1
9.
71
9
-1
.5
32
-4
.3
11
N
um
be
ro
fW
or
ke
rs
10
0.
8
19
8.
8
10
3.
5
-9
8
-0
.7
65
L
og
Ph
ys
ic
al
C
ap
ita
l
8.
13
7
9.
37
1
8.
17
-1
.2
34
-6
.9
22
L
og
W
or
ki
ng
C
ap
ita
l
7.
88
6
10
.0
6
7.
94
3
-2
.1
74
-3
.8
50
Te
xt
ile
s
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
9.
51
6
11
.5
3
9.
97
9
-2
.0
14
-2
.4
70
11
.1
4
11
.0
5
11
.1
2
0.
09
0.
63
3
34
0.
5
40
5.
7
35
5.
9
-6
5.
2
-1
.3
29
10
.4
6
9.
89
4
10
.3
3
0.
56
6
3.
53
1
9.
45
8
9.
53
2
9.
47
5
-0
.0
74
-0
.4
69
L
ea
th
er
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
15
.3
6
18
.3
17
.3
8
-2
.9
4
-2
.1
73
10
.0
1
11
.3
3
10
.9
2
-1
.3
2
-6
.6
30
10
7.
8
18
9.
7
16
4.
8
-8
1.
9
-3
.0
13
9.
02
7
10
.4
2
9.
98
5
-1
.3
93
-5
.1
56
8.
60
5
9.
78
6
9.
41
3
-1
.1
81
-4
.8
10
C
he
m
ic
al
s
N
on
-E
xp
or
te
rs
E
xp
or
te
rs
To
ta
l
di
ff
t-
st
at
20
.3
8
18
.9
7
20
.1
7
1.
41
0.
52
0
10
.4
1
12
.5
8
10
.7
8
-2
.1
7
-7
.7
18
15
9.
5
63
6
24
1.
3
-4
76
.5
-5
.3
19
9.
50
5
11
.8
2
9.
91
1
-2
.3
15
-8
.7
90
9.
04
6
11
.6
4
9.
50
1
-2
.5
94
-8
.8
41
So
ur
ce
:
B
an
gl
ad
es
h
20
02
In
ve
st
m
en
tC
lim
at
e
A
ss
es
sm
en
tS
ur
ve
y,
W
or
ld
B
an
k
17
Table 4: Indicators of Financial Constraints
Non-exporting Exporting Total
Access to Finance: Moderate to Severe
(2-4) Problem
0.6643 0.6095 0.6407
Access to Finance: Major to Severe
(3-4) Problem
0.4506 0.3619 0.4125
Finances for Investment 100%
internally financed∗
0.262 0.1887 0.2305
Finances for Working Capital 100%
internally financed∗
0.1907 0.1321 0.1655
Overdraft facility or line of credit 0.6715 0.6506 0.6626
If yes, % currently unused 22.31 30.36 25.63
Source: Bangladesh Investment Climate Assessment survey: 2002, World Bank. Note: All variables are indicator
variables except for percent of credit line unused. ∗100% internally financed and also reported access to finance as a
problem.
5.1.3 Access to Finance: Non-exporters are more financially constrained than exporting firms and
credit not necessarily allocated according to productivity.
Under perfect financial markets, firms are able to borrow to facilitate production and to overcome the time
delays in the receipt of revenue. However, when access to credit is limited, the amount of cash on hand will
affect the firm’s decision to enter international markets where the time delays are much longer than domestic
sales. Table 4 compares financial indicators between exporting and non-exporting firms. Access to finance
is a subjective variable where respondents are asked to rank the problem from 0, being no problem to 4 as
a severe problem. There is a smaller percentage of exporters who reported access to finance as a problem
than the percentage of non-exporters. Furthermore, non-exporters report greater severity of the problem.
Respondents are also asked where they sourced their financing for investment and for working capital and
report the percentage from each category.23 Exporters source a smaller percent of their finances internally
for both investment and working capital; indicating that exporters do indeed have better access to credit. The
last financial indicator is whether the firm has an overdraft facility or a line of credit available to them, and if
yes, to report the percent of the line unused. Here, a larger proportion of non-exporters than exporters have
overdraft facilities or credit lines however, out of those that do have credit lines, the average percent of credit
lines used by non-exporters is higher. This suggests that non-exporters are closer to their borrowing limit than
exporters or that exporters generally do not use this type of credit as much. Overall, these statistics suggest
that non-exporters have less access to finance than exporters.
It is not only important to verify whether exporters have better access to finance than non-exporting firms
but also to see whether access is allocated according to firm productivity. As discussed in the introduction,
the results of existing theoretical models is driven by a direct correspondence between productivity and the
amount of credit the firm has access to. It is this correspondence that supports the self selection of the most
productive firms into exports even under financial distortion. Table 5 shows the average productivity ac-
cording to each financial variable. There is no significant difference in average productivity between firms
that report access to finance as a problem and between firms that fund investment wholly from internal fi-
23There are 14 categories the respondents are asked to choose to fill in: a. Internal funds or retained earnings b. Local commercial
banks (loan, overdraft) c. Foreign-owned commercial banks d. Leasing or hire purchase arrangement e. Government subsidies f.
Investment Funds/Special Development Financing/ Or Other State Services g. Trade credit (Supplier or customer credit) h. Credit cards
i. Equity (Capital, sales of stock) j. Family, friends k. Informal sources (e.g. money lender) l By selling other assets m. Letters of credit
n. Other (specify source):
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Table 5: Productivity by Financial Constrained Indicator Variables
Average Productivity
Indicator variable= No Yes t-stat
Access Mod-Severe 4.212 4.127 1.123
(1.15) (1.068)
Access Major-Severe 4.18 4.126 0.7616
(1.131) (1.05)
100% Internally financed Investment 4.177 4.115 0.7433
(1.107) (1.105)
100% Internally financed Working Capital 4.193 4.012 1.906
(1.108) (1.09)
Overdraft Facility/Credit line available 3.978 4.256 -3.8719
(0.9985) (1.151)
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
nance. Productivity is slightly higher for those who can borrow to fund working capital24 and those who have
overdraft facilities. The difference in productivity however, does not appear large and the size of the stan-
dard deviations imply considerable overlap in the TFP distribution between constrained and not constrained
categories. Therefore there is no strong evidence to suggest that credit is allocated along productivity lines.
5.2 Working Capital and Distance to Export Destination
The 2002 Bangladesh dataset is unique in that the survey asked firms to list their main export destinations and
amount exported to each of these destinations for years 2000, 2001 and 2002. From this, a weighted export
distance can be calculated for each firm. The availability of data on the distance of the export destination
allows a simple test of the relationship between working capital and the export distance by exporting firms.
This relationship is a key component of the model: the greater the export distance, the longer the delay in the
receipt of payments and the greater the demand for working capital required.25
The empirical question is whether the amount of working capital, X , is significantly and positively cor-
related with export distance among exporting firms controlling for factors that also determine the amount
of working capital. If working capital does not vary with distance, than this puts into doubt whether the
working capital is driven by delays in the receipt of revenues, or is simply a function of costs. The empirical
specification is motivated by the determinants for the amount of cash required to export from Equation 13.
Working capital demand increases with time delay S , cost of production Ct , expected cost of production Ct+1
(to ensure that costs are covered in the interim between production and when revenue is received upon deliv-
ery) and with productivity A. The time delay, S , is proxied by the distance to export destination, distance.
Whether the firm will export in the interim periods during the delays also affect how much working capital is
needed. Therefore, working capital demands would also increase with expected relative foreign to domestic
price, p.
The stock of working capital kept on hand would decrease with supply of liquidity: the amount the
firm can borrow which is measured as short term liabilities, and past export production, proxied by years of
exporting, years exporting.26
24That is, firms that do not fund working capital wholly internally.
25See previous sections as well as refer to Table 2 on page 5 that shows when payments are made and Figure 1 on page 6 for transit
times.
26 Financial constraint variable was not included as this would restrict the sample to one year, and cannot estimate the relationships.
Furthermore, the discount rate β could be proxied by reported interest rates but interest rates were also only available for 2002.
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Table 6: Working Capital and Distance to Export Destination
Lagged Log Working Capital (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log weighed distance to export
destination
0.382 0.464* 0.668** 0.739**
(0.237) (0.241) (0.338) (0.349)
Controls for Cost, Productivity,
Short Term Liabilities, Years
Exporting, Export Price to
Domestic Price,
Yes Yes
Interact sectors*Log distance No No Yes Yes
Observations 848 780 848 780
R-squared 0.007 0.091 0.017 0.099
Number of firms 459 438 459 438
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: 2002 ICA World Bank (with recall data from 2000, 2001.). Regressed using fixed effects for the sample exporting
firms only. Distance data from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII), at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm using distance measured from the capital
city. Up to five countries were reported in the survey (only for 2001 and 2002) and the weighted average distance was
calculated by the proportion of export revenue of each country. Productivity calculated from structural estimation of
the production function (see Ackerberg et al. (2006) ). None of the coefficients for the interactive terms for sector and
log distance were significant and are not reported. Log Yrs Exporting is averaged across products. Full regression in
Appendix 14 in Table 14
The empirical specification is as follows:
Xt = α0distancet+1+α1Ct +α2Ct+1+α3At +α4years exporting+α5creditt +α6 pt+1+ εt +µi
Distance enters the specification as one period ahead as the export distance is realized after the firm
makes it’s export decision based on current working capital levels.27 The destination for exports would
systematically differ according to industry, and the interaction between sectors and export distance were also
included to improve fit.
The specification was estimated using fixed effects and the results are shown in (the full set of estimates
are shown in Appendix 14 in Table 14). Column (1) shows the estimation with no other control variables and
there is no significant correlation between working capital and the distance to export destination. Column
(2) includes controls for cost, productivity and other variables, and columns (3) and (4) include interaction
between sectors and export distance.
The estimated results shows that the correlation between working capital and export distance is positive
and significant when relevant controls are included. Furthermore, the coefficients for the control variables:
Lagged cost, current cost and productivity are correctly signed and significant (see in full estimate results in
Appendix 14 in Table 14). The results show that the size of the estimated coefficient for distance is much
larger than the estimated coefficients for cost and productivity. The distance variable may also be proxying
for additional transport costs associated with shipping longer distances. However, the significant and positive
coefficient suggests that the distance to the export destination could be the largest factor in determining the
27This specification is an approximation given different industries will have different turnover time. The Bangladesh data has a
majority of garment and textile firms reflecting the Bangladesh economy and the specification on the timing of working capital and
export distance one year ahead fits this particular dataset. Specification using the same time period, i.e. Xt and distancet yields a
negative and insignificant coefficient - that supports the specification for distance as a forward variable.
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liquidity needs of the firm, and this could be due to the delays in the receipt of revenues associated with
longer shipping times.
5.3 Export Status of the Firm
The model in the Section 4 provides a set of theoretical predictions that could be put to the data: i) when firms
are financially constrained, export status is driven by the level of working capital and less by productivity
(Areas I, II and IV in Figure 4 ) and ii) when firms are not financially constrained (Areas III, V and VI in
Figure 4 ), export status of the firm is driven by productivity and changes in working capital does not change
the export status of the firm. Thus the main test of the theoretical model is to see whether cash only affects
export decisions when firms are financially constrained and at the same time, whether productivity affect
export decisions when firms are not financially constrained. Let f c be a dummy that indicates whether the
firm is financially constrained, that is whether Xi < X¯ .28 29 The empirical specification is as follows:
Ei = β0 f ci + β1 f ci ∗ Xi + β2Xi + β3 f ci ∗ Ai + β4Ai + controlsi
The test involves four predictions on the estimated coefficients: a) the interaction between financial con-
straints and working capital, β1, is positive and significant, b) the coefficient for working capital only, β2,
should not be significantly different from zero, c) the coefficient for productivity when not constrained, β4,
should be positive and significant and d) the coefficient for productivity under constraints β3 is the negative
of β4 and significant in order for productivity to not affect exports under financial constraints. That is:
H0 : β1 > 0
β2 = 0
β3 =−β4
β4 > 0
The 2002 Bangladesh dataset contains information on the percentage of sales that are exported. Out of
the 974 firm observations, only 76 firms reported exporting less than 100 percent. The majority of firms
report zero exports with about a third of the firms reporting 100 percent exports. The model does not offer
any qualifications on how many firms in the population would export less than 100 percent. However, the fact
that the model does predict that there will exist firms who will choose to export less than 100 percent, even in
the presence of exporting fixed cost, is a unique and important characteristic of the model. The small number
of observations of export percentage makes identification difficult and as a result, the dependent variable used
is a export status dummy, E, that is equal to one if the firm engaged in any exports.
The financial constraint variable, f c, is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm reports access to finance
as a problem (from minor to major severity) and finances working capital entirely from internal finance (that
is, does not use any borrowing from any other sources). The rationale behind interacting these two conditions
is that firms may report access to finance as a problem when they actually do have access to borrowing.
28Note that financial access questions are only available for 2002, and thus the number of observations available for estimation is 990.
29See Chan (2008) for further examination of the financial access variable including sources of variation that determines access to
finance.
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Table 7: Export Status Estimation Results
Probit Export Status
(1) (2) (3)
Financially Constrained -0.4867*** -0.420*** -0.314
(0.0917) (0.137) (0.202)
FC*Log Working Capital 0.1070*** 0.101*** 0.0682**
(0.0317) (0.0281) (0.0298)
FC*Productivity -0.1284 -0.169* -0.126
(0.0937) (0.0966) (0.107)
Log Working Capital 0.0162 0.0288** 0.0298**
(0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Productivity 0.3353*** 0.355*** 0.0621
(0.0357) (0.0477) (0.0419)
Controls No Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No Yes
Observations 959 936 936
Pseudo Rsqr 0.149 0.261 0.391
Log pseudolikelihood -557.6 -472.7 -389.6
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
Notes: Only 2002 data used for estimation, Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Reported marginal effects, Base line for Equation (3) is Garments.
The measure does however, leave out firms that are able to borrow but remain financially constrained due
to reaching borrowing limits or quotas. In this sense, it may not capture all possible financially constrained
firms.
Working capital, X , is measured according to the accounting definition: current assets (inventories,
accounts receivable, cash and short term credit) minus current liabilities (accounts payable and any short
term debt). Productivity, A, is measured as total factor productivity estimated according to Ackerberg et al.
(2006) and the production function is estimated for each sector.30 Controls for other variables in the model
that were available from the dataset are: export price to domestic price ratio, log labor cost, log weighted
input price, age and sector dummies are also included (base sector as Garments).31
The results of export status is shown in Table 7 (full results in Appendix A.4 in Table 13). Results show
that under financial constraints, working capital is significant and positive in determining export status of the
firm, and this result remains robust even with additional controls across all three specifications. The effects
of working capital, without the interaction with financial constraints, is small or insignificant in determining
export status. This suggests that working capital increases the likelihood of a firm exporting mainly when the
firm is financially constrained. A 10 percent increase in working capital raises the probability of exporting by
over 10 percent for a financially constrained firm but by only about 3 percent for a firm that is not constrained.
All estimates pass joint significance tests of β1 and β3. A possible explanation as to why working capital for
non financially constrained firms remains significant under additional controls, even though the size is small
(in regressions (2) and (3)), could be due to the financial constraint measure not capturing all possible firms
that are constrained.
The estimates for productivity for all regressions are signed according to the model’s prediction, that
30Estimates using Levinsohn- Petrin (LP2) does not change sign nor significance, but do to some extent change the size of the
coefficients. See Appendix for productivity measures.
31See Appendix A.3 for table of variables used in estimation.
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is, β2 is negative and β4 is positive. However the size and significance of the coefficients vary across the
3 regressions. Joint significance test of β2 andβ4 can reject the null for specifications (1) and (2). In the
specification (3), both coefficients for productivity are jointly insignificant when sector specific dummies are
included. This could be due to the small sample size within each sector in the dataset. However, in other
empirical studies, such as Greenaway et al. (2007) where empirical specifications always include controls for
sectors, they too find that the estimated coefficient for productivity is not significant and their sample contains
23,641 observations. This could be due to the fact that there is more variation in productivity between sectors
than between firms within a sector, and this may be in part due to how productivity is estimated. Specification
(3) show that within sectors, productivity does not affect export status at all -regardless of whether firms are
constrained or not.
In the first and second regression, without sector dummies, the productivity coefficient is large and highly
significant, in accordance to theory. The coefficients for the interacted productivity and financial constraint
is substantially sized, and only significant in the regression with additional controls. The estimates with
additional controls resonates more due to specification and better fit. The results from regression (2) suggest
that productivity matter less to the export status of financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms, but
the effect does not completely negate the effects of productivity.
Looking at the estimates overall, results provide support for the model’s predictions that the effects of
working capital and productivity will differ between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In-
tuitively, working capital matter more for financially constrained firms, and productivity matters less when
firms are unconstrained.
6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that, particularly in developing countries, financial factors matter for export-
ing. By extending firm trade models to include dynamic borrowing constraints points to the importance of
working capital, as well as productivity for determining the decision to export, the percentage of output that
will be exported and their destination. As such, the working capital model adds an important caveat to the
established literature on the relationship between productivity and the export decision of the firm. Testing
this model empirically with a unique dataset from Bangladesh supports the proposition that working capital
and productivity affect export status of the firm and their effects are differentiated by financial constraints.
Empirical results also confirm the relationship between working capital and the distance to export destina-
tion. The empirical results provide support for the model’s predictions that the affects of working capital and
productivity will differ between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Specifically, for financially
constrained firms, productivity matters less than for unconstrained firms while working capital matters much
more. The correlation between working capital and export distance is shown empirically to be positive and
significant, lending support for the working capital model of the firm’s export decision.
There are many exciting directions future research in this area need to explore, both at the micro and macro
level. On a macro level, the partial equilibrium model of working capital of the firm can be incorporated
into general equilibrium models to look at the propagation of the effects of financial constraints across the
economy and across countries. Further research and exploration into the dynamic interaction between the
financing needs due to time delays and the financial structure of countries has the potential to add insights
to international trade patterns. The distortion that financial constraints introduces to the self-selection of the
most productive firms into exporting warrants further investigation as to how this may affect overall industry
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productivity and thereby the aggregate growth of the economy. In terms of theories of development, if the
results of the model is drawn analogously for an economy represented by a single firm, this could potentially
prescribe a development path where trade liberalization may play a very minor role at low levels of wealth.
This may provide further impetus for developing countries to move quickly in the development of functioning
financial systems that allocate financial resources closely in line with productivity and the availability of short
term credit and trade credit so that the most productive firms enter exports, and aggregate industry productivity
improvements can be reaped from trade liberalization.
On micro level, the working capital model exhibits distortions to factor ratios (also see Chan (2008))
and this could potentially lead to different sectors that export within an economy than those predicted by
comparative advantage trade theories. Of particular significance is the need to develop theoretical models
and empirical tools that will allow the analysis of the firm at sub optimal production levels, and this is crucial
in the study of developing economies where financial constraints are the norm. The estimation of productivity
under these conditions warrants urgent attention.
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A Appendix
A.1 Production Function Estimation
The production function is estimated using the ACF method32, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)33 (LP) as well
as OLS, fixed effects, random effects by industry. The OLS estimate suffer from collinearity and is shown
as a comparison. Fixed effects and random effects estimates relies on strong assumptions on ωit and has
not worked well in practice. The LP estimates relies strictly on specific assumptions on the data generating
process of the inputs to production that may not hold generally (see Ackerberg et al. (2006)) whereas the
ACF estimates allows for more generally plausible assumptions as to when inputs are chosen, and that certain
inputs, such as labor, is ’less variable’ than other inputs, such as materials.
The ACF method is derived from Ackerberg et al. (2006). The production function is assumed to take the
form:
yit = βkkit +βl lit +ωit + εit
Capital is decided at time t− 1. Assuming that labor is “less variable” than materials, suppose that lit is
chosen at time t− b after kitwas chosen at t− 1 but before mit was chosen at t. Assume that ωitevolved ac-
cording to a first order Markov process between sub periods t−1,t−b and t. Given these timing assumptions,
the firm’s material input demand at t will depend on litand kitchosen prior to period t: mit = ft(ωit ,kit , lit).
Inverting this function will yield:
yit = βkkit +βl lit + f−1t (mit ,kit , lit)+ εit
An estimate, Φˆit of the composite term Φt(mit ,kit , lit) = βkkit +βl lit + f−1t (mit ,kit , lit) can be obtained at
this first stage. This represents output net of εit . Given the first-order Markov assumption on ωit ,
ωit = E[ωit |Iit−1]+ξit = E[ωit |ωit−1]+ξit
ξit is mean independent of all information known at t−1. The first moment condition is derived on the timing
assumption that kitwas decided at t−1 and thus uncorrelated with information set Iit−1.
E[ξit |kit ] = 0
The second moment conditions is derived on the timing assumption that lagged labor lit−1 was chosen at
time t−b−1 and is thus also in the information set Iit−1. Thus we get two moment conditions to identify βk
and βl :
E[ξit | kit
lit−1
] = 0
E[ξit ·
(
kit
lit−1
)
] = 0(14)
First, use OLS to estimate initial values of (βk,βl) and compute: ωit(βk,βl)= Φˆit−βkkit−βl lit . Secondly,
32Stata code developed by Sivadasan and Balasubramanian (2007)
33Utilizing the Stata program levpet developed by authors.
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non-parametrically regress ωit(βk,βl) on lag ωit−1(βk,βl) and constant term to obtain ξit(βk,βl). Finally, we
can obtain estimates (βk,βl) from minimizing the sample analogue to the moment conditions in 14 using the
implied ξit(βk,βl).
1
T
1
N ∑t ∑i ξit(βk,βl) ·
(
kit
lit
)
Implementation with Bangladesh Data:
In Sivadasan and Balasubramanian (2007), the ACF method is implemented using capital, skilled labor and
unskilled labor with electricity as the intermediate input/proxy. The Bangladesh data has labor, capital,
raw materials and well as energy costs. The variability over time of each of these variables within firms
in increasing order are: labor, capital, materials and energy. I estimate the production function using two
specifications: 1) using materials as an intermediate input and 2) including materials as an input and using
energy as the proxy:
1. yit = βkkit +βl lit +ωit + εit
mit = ft(ωit ,kit , lit)
2. yit = βkkit +βl lit +βmmit +ωit + εit
eit = ft(ωit ,kit , lit ,mit)
The estimates are given in Table 8 and Table 9 using the full panel Bangladesh data from 2003-2006
(semi-annual). The estimated coefficients for OLS and FE do not differ greatly in their magnitude. The
estimates produced ACF1 using materials as an intermediate input yield unusually large coefficients and
ACF2 using electricity as proxy appear to produce more realistic estimates.
Average productivity calculated by each estimation method is reported in Table 10 and the correlation
matrix is given in Table 11. The productivity estimate from RE is almost perfectly correlated with the OLS
estimate; and the OLS estimate is the naive estimate that suffers from collinearity. Thus, ACF2 estimate and
possibly LP2 may provide good proxy for productivity.
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Table 8: Production Function Estimates by Sector
Garments
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 0.925 0.311 0.227*** 0.0718 0.258*** 0.202*** 0.249***
. . (0.0532) (0.131) (0.0568) (0.0396) (0.0243)
lnk 0.149 0.085 0.181*** 0.0413*** 0.0684*** 0.0167 0.0642***
. (0.0603) (0.0141) (0.0163) (0.0276) (0.0136)
lnm 0.603 0.466*** 0.596*** 0.620*** 0.552*** 0.598***
. (0.109) (0.0269) (0.0275) (0.0193) (0.0135)
Observations 861 861 861 861 861 861 861
# of firms 303 303
Textiles
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 0.413 0.245 0.327*** 0.399** 0.326*** 0.126*** 0.295***
. . (0.0438) (0.167) (0.0390) (0.0442) (0.0267)
lnk 0.753 0.114 0.0536 0.0506* 0.0534** -0.0233 0.0868***
(0.0897) (0.0284) (0.0250) (0.0393) (0.0187)
lnm 0.616 0.462** 0.653*** 0.652*** 0.290*** 0.620***
. (0.209) (0.0298) (0.0271) (0.0415) (0.0180)
Observations 730 730 730 730 730 730 730
# of firms 250 250
Food
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 1.176 0.315 0.300*** 0.698** 0.345*** 0.421*** 0.363***
. . (0.0314) (0.335) (0.0311) (0.101) (0.0326)
lnk 0.294 0.132 0.0236 0.0683*** 0.0708*** -0.0277 0.0725***
. (0.157) (0.0231) (0.0263) (0.0593) (0.0236)
lnm 0.665 0.565*** 0.374 0.669*** 0.511*** 0.643***
. (0.207) (0.272) (0.0316) (0.0451) (0.0212)
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427
# of firms 147 147
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 9: Production Function Estimates by Sector
Leather
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 0.927 0.192 0.166*** 0 0.184*** 0.261 0.189***
. . (0.0556) (0.367) (0.0540) (0.186) (0.0617)
lnk 0.306 -0.005 0 0.0247 0.0394 0.106 0.0467
. (0.222) (0.0352) (0.0314) (0.115) (0.0356)
lnm 0.705 0.671*** 0.646*** 0.680*** 0.674*** 0.670***
. (0.0480) (0.0586) (0.0405) (0.0832) (0.0352)
Observations 275 275 274 274 275 275 275
# of firms 99 99
Electronics
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 0.722 0.422 0.275*** 0.285* 0.279*** 0.0576 0.169***
. . (0.0383) (0.168) (0.0328) (0.0362) (0.0277)
lnk 0.348 0.001 0.0496 0.00273 0.0168 -0.0454 0.0183
. (0.135) (0.0239) (0.0209) (0.0343) (0.0193)
lnm 0.853 0.704*** 0.691*** 0.733*** 2.568*** 1.943***
. (0.212) (0.0308) (0.0253) (0.506) (0.182)
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
# of firms 91 91
Chemicals
ACF1 ACF2 LP1 LP2 OLS FE RE
lnl 0.775 0.143 0.225*** 0 0.228*** 0.237*** 0.346***
. (0.0731) (0.260) (0.0652) (0.0845) (0.0579)
lnk 0.528 0.082 5.84e-08 0.168*** 0.140** 0.321*** 0.278***
. (0.245) (0.0649) (0.0643) (0.0864) (0.0386)
lnm 0.759 0.284 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.334*** 0.438***
. (0.193) (0.0744) (0.0564) (0.0277) (0.0268)
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
# of firms 80 80
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses
Table 10: Productivity Measures: Summary Statistics
Calculated TFP ACF1 ACF2 OLS FE RE LP1 LP2
Garment 4.546 2.300 2.567 4.090 2.894 3.359 4.155
(0.668) (0.316) (0.314) (0.344) (0.316) (0.363) (0.352)
Textile 2.896 2.221 2.042 7.664 2.201 4.020 1.678
(0.816) (0.401) (0.391) (1.030) (0.395) (0.523) (0.399)
Food 2.782 1.479 1.860 3.873 2.010 3.405 3.198
(1.488) (0.499) (0.486) (0.663) (0.489) (0.589) (0.780)
Leather 3.684 2.825 2.680 1.729 2.688 3.247 4.001
(0.998) (0.506) (0.503) (0.532) (0.503) (0.512) (0.562)
Electronic 4.140 0.589 2.054 2.568 1.946 2.060 2.517
(1.010) (0.492) (0.352) (0.463) (0.369) (0.356) (0.364)
Chemical 1.833 1.781 1.781 3.156 2.037 6.882 2.585
(0.908) (0.486) (0.472) (0.682) (0.542) (1.129) (0.534)
Total 3.502 1.999 2.220 4.540 2.397 3.684 3.060
(1.300) (0.724) (0.515) (2.114) (0.563) (1.212) (1.118)
Observations 2786 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783
Notes: Reported means with standard deviation in parentheses
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix of TFP Measures
ACF1 ACF2 OLS FE RE LP1 LP2
ACF1 1
ACF2 0.2486* 1
OLS 0.5947* 0.7498* 1
FE -0.1046* 0.2700* -0.0402* 1
RE 0.6124* 0.7743* 0.9582* 0.0344* 1
LP1 -0.2637* 0.3435* 0.0323* 0.2835* 0.1374* 1
LP2 0.6113* 0.3989* 0.7011* -0.5176* 0.7352* -0.0918* 1
Table 12: Interquartile Range and Median of Productivity by Industry
Productivity:TFP 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Garments Non-Exporters 2.14 2.24 2.47
Exporters 2.09 2.24 2.46
Textiles Non-Exporters 2.06 2.2 2.34
Exporters 2.04 2.22 2.42
Food Non-Exporters 1.19 1.42 1.71
Exporters 1.02 1.35 1.62
Leather Non-Exporters 2.55 2.77 2.88
Exporters 2.68 2.83 3.03
Electronics Non-Exporters 0.31 0.517 0.892
Exporters 0.293 0.363 1.06
Chemical Non-Exporters 1.48 1.71 1.95
Exporters 1.48 1.75 2.18
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A.2 Productivity Distribution Between Exporters and Non Exporters by Sector
A.3 Variable Description
Variable Description
FC Indicator variable: Finances for Working Capital
100% internally financed and the firm access to
finance as a problem (of any levels)
lnwc Log Working Capital. Working capital as defined by
accounting definition: current assets (inventories,
accounts receivable, cash and short term credit) minus
current liabilities (accounts payable and any short
term debt)
FC*Log Working Capital Interactive term: financial constraint and log working
capital.
Productivity: ACF Total factor productivity estimated according to
Ackerberg et al. (2006)
FC*Productivity Interactive term: financial constraint and productivity
total factor productivity estimated according to
Ackerberg et al. (2006)
Export Price to Domestic Price ratio Ratio of export price to domestic price. For firms
where ratio is missing, filled in with average ratio
taken across year and sector.
Log Labor Cost Total wage bill divide by the number of employees.
Log Input Price Weighted average price of top three most important
inputs.
Age Years since establishment.
A.4 Export Status
A.5 Working Capital and Distance to Export Destination
32
Table 13: Export Status Estimation Results
Probit Export Status
(1) (2) (3)
Financially Constrained -0.4867*** -0.420*** -0.314
(0.0917) (0.137) (0.202)
FC*Log Working Capital 0.1070*** 0.101*** 0.0682**
(0.0317) (0.0281) (0.0298)
FC*Productivity -0.1284 -0.169* -0.126
(0.0937) (0.0966) (0.107)
Log Working Capital 0.0162 0.0288** 0.0298**
(0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Productivity 0.3353*** 0.355*** 0.0621
(0.0357) (0.0477) (0.0419)
Export Price to Domestic Price ratio 0.185*** -0.0506
(0.0207) (0.0984)
Log Labor Cost -0.0479 0.00266
(0.0430) (0.0349)
Log Input Price: Weighted 0.0163* 0.0320***
(0.00990) (0.0100)
Age -0.000668 0.00246
(0.00142) (0.00160)
Textile Sector -0.574***
(0.0881)
Food Sector -0.519***
(0.0284)
Leather Sector -0.333**
(0.132)
Electronics Sector -0.512***
(0.0375)
Chemical Sector -0.461***
(0.0265)
Observations 959 936 936
Pseudo Rsqr 0.149 0.261 0.391
Log pseudolikelihood -557.6 -472.7 -389.6
Source: Bangladesh 2002 Investment Climate Assessment Survey, World Bank
Notes: Only 2002 data used for estimation, Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Reported marginal effects, Base line for Equation (3) is Garments.
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Table 14: Working Capital and Distance to Export Destination
Lagged Log Working Capital (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log weighed distance to
export destination
0.382 0.464* 0.668** 0.739**
(0.237) (0.241) (0.338) (0.349)
Lagged Log Total Cost 0.339*** 0.322***
(0.107) (0.108)
Log Total Cost 0.233** 0.222**
(0.0917) (0.0929)
Lagged Total Factor
Productivity
0.212* 0.205*
(0.111) (0.112)
Log Short Term Liabilities -0.00735 0.00681
(0.116) (0.117)
Log Yrs Export 0.160 0.174
(0.117) (0.120)
Export Price to Domestic
Price ratio
0.0230 0.0229
(0.0220) (0.0222)
Interact sectors*Log distance No No Yes Yes
Constant 5.971*** -1.877 4.267* -3.054
(2.112) (3.031) (2.479) (3.664)
Observations 848 780 848 780
R-squared 0.007 0.091 0.017 0.099
Number of firms 459 438 459 438
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: 2002 ICA World Bank (with recall data from 2000, 2001.). Regressed using fixed effects for the sample exporting
firms only. Distance data from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII), at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm using distance measured from the capital
city. Up to five countries were reported in the survey (only for 2001 and 2002) and the weighted average distance was
calculated by the proportion of export revenue of each country. Productivity calculated from structural estimation of the
production function (see Ackerberg et al. (2006) ). None of the coefficients for the interactive terms for sector and log
distance were significant and are not reported. Log Yrs Exporting is averaged across products.
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